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Environmental law is a loose amalgam of common law and
(increasingly) statutory provisions designed to protect public health,
ecosystems, and dependent animal and plant species. The modern
regulatory schemes established by statutes are of recent vintage, but
common-law remedies for environmental damage have existed for
centuries.' Widespread public recognition of environmental degradation in the United States culminated in the first Earth Day in 1970,
focusing attention on the inadequacies of common law tort and property
concepts to prevent environmental damage and ushering in a new era
of statutory enactment and administrative implementation. After two
decades of statutes largely (although not exclusively) concentrating on
environmental impact assessment and "command and control" regulation, there is now considerable interest in employing economic incentives to encourage environmental improvements.2
This Article provides an overview of the environmental law field
and introduces some of its major themes. The Article does not attempt
to comprehensively review the substance of environmental law.
Treatises are available which endeavor to do so.' Rather, this is an
effort to supply a brief overview of the field and to survey its theoretical
underpinnings, characteristic approaches, and its future. The emphasis
is necessarily on developments in the United States, for that is where
modern environmental law was conceived and has been most fully
developed, but the themes this Article emphasizes are generic.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ENViRONMENTAL LAW
One of the chief characteristics of environmental law-which
quickly becomes apparent to its students-is its immense scope.
Common-law concepts of nuisance and trespass; legislation requiring
environmental impact assessment, pollution control, natural resource
protection and development, species preservation, and environmental

1

See, e.g., William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1611) (allowing an

adjacent landowner to recover in nuisance against an owner of a pigsty).
' See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985);
Hahn & Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era From an Old Idea?,
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988).
1S. NOVIK, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1987); W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
AIR, WATER, PESTICIDES, Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES (4 vols.) (1986, 1988,
1992); F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK (1981).
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cleanup; and even land use regulation may all fall under the rubric of
environmental law. This section discusses the role each of these
subfields plays. Section II aims at broader concepts such as the
scientific and economic bases for environmental regulation,4 alternatives to regulation,5 and the prospect of expanding the law's emphasis
from environmental residuals to consumption and manufacturing
decisions.6
A Beginnings of Modern EnvironmentalLaw
Environmental conflicts are certainly not new; the first smoke
ordinance in England dates from 1273,' and the first reported case
occurred in 1611.8 But modern nuisance law-the backbone of
environmental law-was shaped by the industrial revolution s As a
result, the nuisance cases of enduring significance are those of the last
century.' ° While nuisance did afford environmental plaintiffs some
relief, its after-the-fact remedies, its difficult burden of proving damage
(especially to health), and its fault and causation requirements made it
an inadequate basis upon which to premise a comprehensive scheme of
environmental protection, especially in view of the pervasive lack of
information on the long-term effects of environmental contaminants."
Not until after World War II was there sufficient interest to pass
environmental legislation, and that which was enacted was generally
limited to the state and local level and either poorly conceived or badly
enforced. 2 Interest in environmental legislation on the federal level

4
Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 429 (1971); Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and
Some Criticisms,50 IND. L.J. 426 (1975); McGarity, Media-Quality,Technology and Cost-Benefit
BalancingStrategiesfor Health andEnvironmentalRegulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159
(Summer 1983).
' See sources cited supra note 2.
6 Reitze, Environmental Policy-ItIs Time for a New Beginning, 14 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111
(1989).
' See Chass & Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 349, 352 (1954) (citing W.
STEER, THE LAW OF SMOKE NUISANcE (2d ed. 1945)).
a See supra note 1.
9 M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAw 1780-1860 at 74-78 (1977); W.
RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12 (1977).
10Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases
About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761 (1979).
"I Gelpe, Organizing Themes of Environmental Law, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 897, 899
(1990).
1
2 j. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON THE CALIFORNIA AND
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became widespread only after a number of popular studies of environmental were published in the 1960s, most notably Rachel Carson's
Silent Spring" and a series of polemics by Ralph Nader's study
group. 4 Thereafter, the peculiar political dynamics of the day produced a rapid succession of major initiatives concerning environmental
assessment and air and water pollution control. 5
Contemporaneously, developments in administrative law were
granting private citizens "standing" to challenge agency actions in
court.' 6 Moreover, courts began to require agencies to document
decision making in written records explaining how and why particular
actions were consistent with authorizing statutes and were reasoned on
the basis of available information." These developments gave environmental plaintiffs the opportunity to challenge administrative decisions
in court and many of the early landmark administrative law cases
involved the environment.'"
B. Environmental Impact Assessment
The Magna Carta of American environmental law is the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).' 9 NEPA makes environmental protection the mandate of all federal government agencies.
The statute also requires federal agencies to evaluate the environmental

FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940-1975 (1977).
13 R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
14 J. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR: THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP ON AIR POLLUTION (1970);
D. ZWICK, WATER WASTELAND: RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON WATER POLLUTION
(1972).

" Elliot et al., TowardA Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalizationof Environmental
Law, 1 J. LAW, ECON. & ORGANIZATION 313 (1985).

" Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). But see Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177
(1990) (denying standing to an environmental group for failing to allege facts specific enough
to show injury resulting from agency action).
"7Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
" E.g., Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
(1966); Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmakingand the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
509 (1974); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970).
1942 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988); see V. FOGELMAN, GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: INTERPRETATIONS, APPLICATIONS AND COMPLIANCE (1990); D. MANDELKER,
NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (1984); Symposium on the National Environmental Policy Act at
Twenty, 20 ENVTL. L. 447-810 (1990).
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effects of their activities in advance, to evaluate alternatives to proposed
actions, and to inform and involve the public and other agencies in their
decision making.20 But Congress included no explicit enforcement
mechanism in NEPA. Consequently, it has been left to the courts to
enjoin agency actions where they are unaccompanied by sufficient
environmental documentation, or where that documentation fails to
disclose fully the anticipated environmental impacts. Frequently, these
court injunctions are premised on adverse comments submitted by
agencies with environmental expertise. 21 However, NEPA supplies no
basis for a court to enjoin an agency project on the merits-because it
is not the most environmental alternative, or even antienvironmental.
All NEPA demands is that the environmental impacts of proposed
activities and reasonable alternative courses of action be evaluated and
publicly disclosed, and that comments from the public and other
agencies be given a good faith written response. This lack of "substance" in NEPA, this assumption that good environmental information
will inevitably produce good environmental decision making, has led
some to call for amendments to strengthen NEPA. 22 No major
amendments have occurred during NEPA's two decades, however.
Some other limitations of NEPA warrant mention. First, NEPA
governs only federal actions; state, local, or private activities are subject
to the statute only if they require a federal license or permit. Many
states have, however, enacted "little-NEPAs" which do require environmental evaluation of activities not requiring federal approval.2 3
Second, only federal actions with "significant" environmental effects
require detailed analysis in environmental impact statements;24 federal
actions which do not produce significant environmental effects need only
briefer analyses, termed environmental assessments. 25 Third, a
variety of actions have been exempted from NEPA analysis altogether,
most commonly because they are subject to expeditious statutory time

See Blumm, The Origin, Evolutioh, and Direction of the U.S. National Environmental
Policy Act, 5 ENVTL. & PLANNING J. 179 (1988).
21 Blumin & Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The Role of Comment Agencies in
NEPA Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 277 (1990).
' See Blumm, The NationalEnvironmental Policy Act at Twenty: A Preface, 20 ENVTL. L.

447, 477-83 (1990).
2 See S. NOVIK, supra note 3, § 6.03[1](c).
24Id. § 4332 (2)(C); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502 (1992) (contents of an environmental impact statement), 1508.27 (definition of "significance").
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1992) (contents of an environmental assessment).
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deadlines 21 or constitute ministerial actions involving no administrative discretion.27 Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court
has consistently interpreted NEPA in a narrow fashion, recently
suggesting that an adequate NEPA analysis need not include a "worst
case analysis" or incorporate a fully developed mitigation plan.'
Despite these limitations, it is not an overstatement to suggest
that NEPA revolutionized environmental law. The nation's environmental policy made environmental protection the mandate of all federal
officials, led to considerable improvements in interagency coordination,
and gave the public an opportunity to participate meaningfully in
environmental protection. NEPA also spawned a number of other
statutes requiring environmental assessment on the state, local, and
international level. For example, under Canada's statute, a Federal
Environmental Assessment Review Office commissions independent
panels to review anticipated environmental impacts and underwrites
the cost of participation by intervenors, usually environmental
organizations. 2 Even more far-reaching is the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, which establishes the state's "paramount concern for
the protection of its natural resources," and allows the state or any of
its citizens to file suit against anyone likely to impair those resources.
The Michigan statute generally shifts the burden of proof from plaintiffs
to defendants, requiring the latter to justify their actions by showing
that there exists "no feasible and prudent alternative" to their activi-.
ties. °
C. Pollution Control
While NEPA and its progeny are aimed at ensuring that governmental activities receive environmental scrutiny, nongovernmental

Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Oklahoma, 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
South Dakota v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Berkland, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657
F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
' Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989); Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); see also Rodgers, NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and
Recruitment in Environmental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. 485 (1990); Shilton, Is the Supreme Court

Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanationsfor a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551 (1990); Yost,
NEPA's Promise-PartiallyFulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533 (1990).
" Hunt, A Note on Environmental Impact Assessments in Canada,20 ENVTL. L. 789 (1990).

30MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1203 (West 1991); see Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r,
224 N.W. 883 (Mich. 1975); see also Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years'
Experience Under the Michigan EnvironmentalProtectionAct, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1974).
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activities producing air, water, and land pollution are governed by
specific statutory schemes such as the Clean Air Act (CAA), 3 1 the
Clean Water Act (CWA),3 2 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 3 which controls handling and disposal of hazardous
wastes. These are extremely intricate and detailed statutes, and
thorough analyses of them must be left to other studies.3 4 However,
the pollution control statutes do share common approaches that warrant
mention here.
First, institutionally, all the pollution control statutes involve
federal-state partnerships. The federal role is generally to set standards, provide financial and technical assistance, and enforce against
violators. Unlike NEPA, which implicates all federal agencies, the
pollution control statutes make standard-setting, financial assistance
and enforcement the responsibility of one federal agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The state role is generally that of
developing plans to achieve federal standards, issuing permits to
polluters (where EPA has granted them permit-issuing authority), and
enforcing against violators (a role shared by EPA). Except in the case
of mobile sources such as automobiles, states may usually set stricter
standards for pollution sources within their boundaries.
Second, pollution control standards are of two general types:
ambient standards-which prescribe maximum total concentration
levels from all sources in an environmental medium-and emission
standards-which prescribe the amount of emissions a particular
pollutant source may emit. Ambient standards, which usually are set
to protect public health, enable the division of particular geographic
areas into "dirty" or "clean" classifications, with the former generally
requiring stricter source controls than emission standards alone would
require, in order to bring the area into compliance with the ambient
standards. Emission standards are set industry by industry, on a
nationwide basis, without regard to local environmental conditions, on
the basis of best available technology. Thus, geographic areas cannot
gain advantages by offering their environmental amenities to polluting
industries. Cost is a relevant factor, especially with respect to the
technology available to existing sources. New sources usually must
3142 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. 1992).
32

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387(1988 & Supp. 1992).

33

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. 1992).

' See W. RODGERS, supra 3; S. NOVICK, supra note 3; D. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL

LAW AND ANALYSIS (Callaghan 1981).
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meet stricter technological standards. Both ambient and emission
standards are reflected in pollution permits that nearly all large
pollution sources must obtain from EPA or the states.
A third common characteristic of pollution control schemes
concerns their enforcement. EPA and the states have concurrent
enforcement authority against violators. This authority includes both
the ability to file suits seeking injunctions and criminal and civil
penalties as well as the authority to levy administrative fines without
going to court for small violations. In addition, the statutes authorize
private citizens (such as environmental organizations) to bring suit to
enjoin and seek penalties from violators where EPA or the states choose
not to take enforcement action. Significantly, these "citizen suits" may
be filed not only against polluters but also against EPA or the states
where they have failed to take action made nondiscretionary by
3 5 Citizen plaintiffs who prevail on the merits may recover
statute.
36
attorney and expert witness fees.
Finally, a noticeable shift in the pollution control schemes is the
growing emphasis placed on economic incentives to promote compliance. 7 For example, increasingly, the amount of civil penalties is
being calculated on the basis of removing any economic advantage
gained from noncompliance.3 8 Even more striking is the movement
toward allowing discharges in compliance with standards to trade
emission authorizations among themselves so long as they do not
violate ambient standards.3 9 This "emissions trading" is an effort to
make the pollution control laws more economically efficient.4 ° Emission taxes have, however, been largely resisted in the United States,
although they have been influential elsewhere, such as Germany, for
example. 4 '

3J.

MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS

(Wiley Law Publications 1987); Austin, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental
Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 220 (1987).

" Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
37 F.

ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

(1977); see also Hahn & Stavins, supra note 2.
' See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1988) (noncompliance penalties under the Clean Air Act).
3, Tripp & Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights

Programs,6 YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1989).
40 Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q.
361 (1989); see also Stewart, supra note 2; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 2.
41
Brown & Johnson, Pollution Controlby Effluent Charges: It Works in the FederalRepublic
of Germany, Why Not in the U.S.?, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 929 (1984); Hahn, Economic

Prescriptionsfor EnvironmentalProblems: How the PatientFollowed Doctor'sOrders, J. ECON.
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Brief mention must be made of some of the distinguishing
characteristics among the three major pollution control schemes. The
Clean Air Act emphasizes federal ambient standards, allowing states
considerable flexibility to design individual emission standards so long
as the ambient standards are achieved.4 2 Under the 1990 amendments to the statute, however, there is an increased federal role in
setting emission standards for hazardous air pollutants.4 The
amendments also authorize a prominent role for emissions trading,
particularly in their provisions regulating the long-range transport of
sulfur emissions (acid rain)."' The amendments also tightened
emission standards for motor vehicles (the most serious source of urban
air pollution), including establishing a new program to change the
composition of gasoline in heavily polluted cities.4 5 However, no
attempt was made to provide incentives for reducing reliance on vehicle
miles traveled, so improvements in tailpipe emissions will remain the
exclusive hope for improved urban air quality.
The Clean Water Act has historically relied more on federal
emission standards than the Clean Air Act, basing such emission
standards on a variety of complex technological availability tests.4 6
Ambient standards have been left largely to the states, perhaps because
watersheds are more geographically discrete, but the EPA has an
important (and growing) oversight role.4 7 For example, the 1987
amendments required EPA to establish new controls over dischargers
on streams that are not achieving water quality standards due to toxic
emissions."' But the Act still leaves entirely to state discretion the
control over "non-point" pollution (that is, pollution from other than
from a discharge point, such as runoff from farming, forestry, and
construction activities).4 9 Thus, fully one-half of the nation's water

PERSP.
95 (1989).
42
D. CuRRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS (1981); Luneberg, The National
Quest for Clean Air, 1970-1978: IntergovernmentalProblemsand Some Proposed Solutions, 73
Nw. U. L. REV. 397 (1978).
43 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (West Supp. 1992).
Id. §§ 7651-7651o.
45 Id. §§ 7521-7554 (auto emission controls), 7581-7590 (new fuels); see also R. FINDLEY &
D. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 249-250 (3d ed. 1991).
41 Pedersen, Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1988).
47 Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act,
36 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1983).
48 33 U.S.C. § 13141 (1988).
49Id. §§ 1288, 1329.
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pollution is effectively beyond federal control.'
Finally, the Clean Water Act has always placed greater reliance on
economic subsidies than the other pollution control statutes because a
considerable amount of water pollution is due to domestic waste
produced by municipal dischargers. In the past, the federal government
funded seventy-five percent of the cost of municipal treatment facilities,
but that subsidy has now been reduced to fifty-five percent.5
RCRA governs regulation of hazardous waste disposal.5 2 RCRA
is structurally similar to the Clean Water Act, particularly in its
emphasis on federal emission standards. This structural similarity is
perhaps fitting, since a chief RCRA concern is prevention of groundwater contamination, something the Clean Water Act, in its concern for
surface water, largely overlooked. But RCRA affects more than just the
discharge of hazardous wastes; it controls their generation and
transportation as well as their disposal in a "cradle to grave" regulatory
scheme.5" Nonhazardous wastes are not subject to this scheme and
are left largely to state control.54 To a degree greater than any other
pollution control statute, RCRA spells out detailed standards in the
legislation itself.55 These so-called hammer provisions are among the
most complex in all of federal law and are a reflection of Congress'
unwillingness to leave hazardous waste standard setting to EPA.5 6 On
the other hand, despite the fact that the statute's goals include
increased recycling, there has been little direct federal attention devoted
to resource recovery, although the increased costs associated with RCRA
compliance have indirectly provided incentives to recycle if, by doing so,
RCRA's regulatory net can be avoided.
D. Environmental Cleanup
The pollution control statutes focus on preventing or minimizing
ongoing and future activities. In contrast, the Comprehensive Envi-

'o See Fentress, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Groundwater,and the 1987 Water Quality Act:
Section 208 Revisited?, 19 ENVTL. L. 807 (1989).
5' 33 U.S.C. § 1282.
52 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
F. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 601-14 (2d ed. 1990).
42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a (1988 & Supp. 1992).
55 See, e.g., id. § 6924(oX5)(B) (minimum technological requirements for hazardous waste
disposal facilities).
" Florio, Congress as a Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3 YALE
J. ON REG. 351 (1986).
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ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)6 7
looks backward, to past disposal of hazardous wastes. For this reason,
CERCLA is not a typical regulatory scheme, but is in fact a liability
scheme. The Act imposes strict and joint and several liability on all
generators and transporters of hazardous waste as well as owners, both
past and present, of disposal facilities (responsible parties) for the costs
of cleaning up contaminated sites.' Where the responsible parties do
not cleanup contaminated sites, CERCLA authorizes the government to
do so (although the responsible parties remain financially liable).5"
The statute also establishes a fund which pays for government-initiated
cleanups. This "Hazardous Substance Superfund," authorized at $8.5
billion for 1986-1991, is financed by taxes on chemical feedstocks and
petroleum, a new environmental corporate tax, general funds, and
reimbursements from responsible parties.'
CERCLA requires EPA to evaluate and list sites in need of
cleanup. By 1991, the agency had identified nearly 1100 sites on the
National Priorities List,6 1 but some estimates of the total number of
sites run as high as 30,000.62 Costs per site average between $20-30
million for surface and groundwater cleanup. Cleanups, even those
undertaken by responsible parties, must undergo extensive public
participation, be approved by EPA, and meet detailed cleanup standards, including regulatory standards established under most federal
and state environmental statutes. 6 Because of the severe liability
scheme, and because all government cleanup costs are reimbursable,
responsible parties have strong incentives to negotiate with EPA to
provide for cleanup.'
CERCLA also subjects responsible parties to liability for natural
resource damage resulting from hazardous waste releases, including
damage to land, fish, wildlife, air, water, and so forth.6 5 Responsible

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
'9 Id. § 9604.
'o Id. § 9611; see Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the
ComprehensiveEnvironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 BUS. LAW.
923 (1990).
" See 40 C.F.R. § 300 app. B (1991).
62 See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 45, at 535.
57

63
4

See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 617-18.

Anderson, Negotiationand Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE

L.J. 261; Weber, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1469 (1989).
6542 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1992); see also Breen, CERCLA's NaturalResources
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parties are liable only to the federal government, the states, or Indian
tribes. There is no private recovery under CERCLA for damage to
private property. The measure of natural resource damages is
presumptively the cost of restoration of the damaged resources,
although at some point (it is not yet clear when) restoration costs must
give way to concerns for economic efficiency.'
Finally, CERCLA contains important provisions that are not
concerned with cleanup of, or damages associated with, hazardous
waste sites. Title III of the statute, known as the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act," requires local governments to
have emergency plans to deal with chemical hazards and provides the
public with information concerning chemical hazards produced in local
communities. All owners and operators of chemical facilities must
notify local community emergency response organizations any time a
release of hazardous substances occurs.6 8 Further, owners and
operators must routinely supply state and local authorities with detailed
information about the chemicals they use and release into the environment. 9 Like NEPA, the statute assumes that disclosure of this
information to the public will induce changes in behavior, prompting
chemical manufacturers to reduce reliance on toxic chemicals and to
recycle rather than dispose of chemicals, wherever possible.7 °
E. Chemical Screening
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring sounded the call for chemical
regulation in 1962. Three decades later, control of toxic chemicals is a
major concern of environmental law. However, there is no single
statutory scheme-in fact, both CERCLA and RCRA, as well as the
Clean Air and Water Acts focus extensively on toxic controls.7 1

Damage Provision: What Do We Know So Far?, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,304
(1984).
' Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 11004 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
6Id. §§ 11021-11023.
"oBlomquist, The Logic and Limits of Public Information Mandates Under Federal
Hazardous Waste Law: A Policy Analysis, 14 VT. L. REV. 559 (1990).
7'42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (regulation of hazardous air pollutants); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317 (regulation of toxic water pollutants); see Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f -j
(1988) (safe drinking water maximum contaminated levels); see also ANDERSON ET AL., supra
note 53, at 556-69; Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990);
Graham, The FailureofAgency-Forcing: The Regulation ofAirborne CarcinogensUnderSection
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Moreover, food additives, ' 2 pesticides," chemicals in the workplace,74 and manufacture of new chemicals75 are the subject of separate regulatory schemes.76
Chemical regulation is premised on risk assessment, and the risk
standards vary among the statutes.7 7 For example, the Delaney
Clause subjects food additives to a "zero-risk" standard,7' 8 but pesticides are not usually considered food additives. 79 EPA registers
pesticides under the terms of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to prevent "unreasonable risk to man or the
environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide."' ° This explicit
call for cost-benefit balancing is unusual in environmental regulation
and arguably has led to ineffective public protection." Workplace
standards regulate only "significant" risks. 2 Regulation of new
chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)"3 forges a
middle ground risk assessment, rejecting both the Delaney Clause's
absolutist approach and FIFRA's utilitarian balancing, in favor of a premarket testing scheme designed to prevent unreasonable risk to health
or the environment, especially imminent hazards.8 4 This standard
requires some consideration of costs, but does not require regulation to
be premised on a showing that adverse health effects outweigh a
112 of the CleanAir Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100.
72

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988 & Supp. 1992).

v'Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
14 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
7'Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
78
T. SCHOENBAUM & R. ROSENBERG, ENVIRoNMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND
READINGS 332-36 (2d ed. 1991); McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in
Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and
OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
" Gillette & Krier, Risk, Courts & Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990).
7821 U.S.C. § 348(cX3XA) (1988) ("No additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to
induce cancer when ingested by man or animal.").
7 Poliner, The Regulation of Carcinogenic Pesticide Residues in Food: The Need to
Reevaluate the Delaney Clause, 7 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 111, 138 (1987); Merrill, Regulating
Carcinogens in Food: A Legislator's Guide to the Food Safety Provisions of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 77 MICH. L. REV. 171, 179 (1978).
80 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1988).
"See 3 W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 5.8 at 106-08.
82 Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980);
see also Latin, The "Significance"of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmciking
Under Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1982); Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight
of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 191 (1980).
83 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
'4 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1XA), (h) (1988).
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chemical's benefits.8
TSCA was recently amended to abate two prominent public health
risks, asbestos hazards in schools and public and commercial buildings
and indoor radon emissions.8" The statute, in tandem with FIFRA,
forms the core of federal regulation of the emerging biotechnology
field.8 7 TSCA also has been recently promoted as the key to developing an integrated, cross-media approach to chemical regulation in
particular and pollution control in general.'B
F. Special Area Protection
Environmental law extends beyond environmental impact assessment,
pollution control, and environmental cleanup to include protection of
specially designated lands and wildlife. Influenced by nature writers
such as Henry David Thoreau and George Perkins Marsh, the United
States pioneered the concept of setting aside lands for preservation
purposes with the establishment of Yellowstone National Park in
1872.89 Over the last century and a quarter, numerous national parks
have been established to conserve scenery and wildlife and promote
public access to nature preserves.9" Other land reserves such as
national forests, national wildlife refuges, wild and scenic rivers, and
wilderness areas have been set aside for preservation purposes,
although some controlled development is also permissible.9 Land
reserves also exist on the state and local level, but these are small in
size compared to the federal lands, which constitute one-third of the
entire land area of the United States.
The Clean Water Act supplies a limited form of special ecosystem
protection by requiring a federal permit prior to the filling of any
wetland, regardless of whether or not the area is privately owned. 92

8 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 582-90.

15 U.S.C. §§ 2650-2655 (asbestos); 2661-2671 (radon).
8

7 McGarity, FederalRegulation ofAgriculturalBiotechnologies, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1089

(1987); Shapiro, Biotechnology and the Design of Regulation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1990).
" Guruswamy, IntegratingThoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environmental Mind?, 1989
WIs. L. REV. 463, 523-25.
89 C. WILKINSON,

THE AMERICAN WEST:

A NARRATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY AND STUDY IN

REGIONALISM 18-19 (1989).
90 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
91 2 G. COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW §§ 14.01-15.05 (1990).
9233 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. 1992). Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, and
bogs and are defined as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water
at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
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The federal government has also funded state planning efforts to better
control development along the nation's coastal areas under the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972. 93 Both coastal areas and wetlands
recently have been the subject of federal legislation removing economic
subsidies that in the past encouraged development of these fragile
ecosystems. 94
G. Species Preservation
An increasingly influential area of environmental law is protection of
designated species from harvesting and other destructive activities.9 5
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 197296 imposed a ban on the
"taking"97 of marine mammals. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act 98
regulates the taking of migratory birds.
The most important species preservation law is the Endangered
Species Act (ESA),99 which generally forbids the hunting, importation,
or sale of listed species."' The ESA protects both species listed as
"endangered"-defined as those which are in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of their range-and those listed
as "threatened"-species likely to become endangered in the foreseeable
future.'0 ' The ESA's far-reaching consequences are due to the fact
that it supplies protection not only for the listed species, but also for
areas designated as Critical habitat for species survival. It thus has
altered land and water developments, including dam and highway

support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." 40
C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1991). See also Blumm & Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the
Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, IntergovernmentalTension, and a Call for Reform,
60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695 (1989); Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO.L. REV. 773
(1989).
9316 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988).
' Jones, The Coastal Barrier Resources Act: A Common Cents Approach to Coastal
Protection, 21 ENVTL. L. 1015 (1991); Tripp & Herz, Wetland Preservation and Restoration:
Changing FederalPriorities,7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 221 (1988).
95M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 67-103 (2d ed. 1983).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
'7 Taking means to "harass, hunt, capture, or kill." Id. § 1362(12).
This definition of
"taking" is substantially similar to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) definition.
9816 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1988).
"16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
100 D. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION 33 (1989).
'0' 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20) (1988).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986648

324

J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

[Vol. 12

construction, timber harvesting, and real estate development. 1 2
However, the ESA does not block all development affecting listed
species; projects may proceed (1) consistent with conditions developed
during consultation with fish and wildlife agencies, (2) under approved
habitat conservation plans, or (3) with special exemptions granted by an
interagency review committee." s Unlike the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which legislatively extends protection to all marine mammals,
the ESA confers protection only on species which are designated
through an administrative rulemaking process that includes opportunity
for public review and comment.
H. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Just as economic alternatives to "command and control" regulation
have won adherents, in recent years there has been considerable
interest in employing alternative dispute resolution techniques as a
substitute for environmental litigation. Negotiation and settlement
agreements now are commonplace in environmental cleanups under
CERCLA.'0 4 Mediated settlements have also been employed in civil
enforcement and public land and resource disputes.0 5 One study of
161 environmental disputes found that 132 of them attempted to reach
a negotiated settlement, and that 103 (78%) did so successfully." e
A particularly controversial form of alternative dispute resolution
is negotiated rulemaking. Its defenders claim it allows interest groups
to focus on their real interests, allows face-to-face negotiations with
opposing groups and reduces the prospects for dilatory litigation.0 7
Opponents of regulatory negotiation contend that it supplants a public
process with an essentially private one and can displace the role of

"o See Coggins & Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in Pork Barrels: Endangered
Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1433 (1982).
103 Thorton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat ConservationPlanning
Under the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973,21 ENVTL. L. 605 (1991); Kilbourne, The Endangered
Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look from a Litigator'sPerspective, 21 ENVTL. L.
499, 508-11 (1991).
104 See Anderson, supra note 64.
105 See Grad, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
157, 161 (1989).
'0 G. BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE 72-74
(1986).
107See Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982).
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administrative agencies in seeking out and pursuing the public
interest.10 8 Others wonder whether a negotiated rule should receive
the same judicial deference to agency expertise as a traditional agency
rule when challenged by a party claiming it was not represented in the
negotiations.0 9 Other critics of alternative dispute resolution worry
that environmental groups risk cooption and unequal bargaining power
when participating in mediation processes" 0 and allege that alternative dispute resolution lacks the fact-finding capabilities of adversarial
litigation."' Nevertheless, CERCLA's provisions encouraging settlements 1 2 seem destined to supply numerous case studies to examine
the efficacy of environmental alternative dispute resolution in the
coming years.
II. ESSAYS FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SEMINAR
Choosing articles for an environmental law seminar is a difficult
task, given space limitations, the enormity of the subject matter, and
the quality of the commentary. This selection does not purport to
represent the "best" or "classic" articles in the field, although many do
fall into that category. It does, however, provide the reader with a
broad introduction and survey of the diverse philosophies, themes, and
debates which have and will continue to animate environmental law.
All of the articles are from legal periodicals; shorter articles were
preferred over longer ones. Other sources are included in the footnotes,
which contains numerous other excellent articles and books that ought
to be consulted, depending on the reader's interest.

108

See Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public

Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987).
" See Wald, Negotiationof EnvironmentalDisputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 1, 17-33 (1985).
"' See Amy, The Politics of Environmental Mediation, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1983);
Schoenbrod, Limits and Dangers of Environmental Mediation: A Review Essay, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1453, 1466-71 (1983).
"' See Brunet, The Costs of EnvironmentalAlternative DisputeResolution, 18 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENvTL. L. INST.) 10,515 (1988).
112
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988), which authorizes settlement agreements, including
provisions for "covenants not to sue" (§ 9222(f)), non-binding allocation of responsibility (§
9622(eX3)(C)), and de minimus settlements (§ 9222(g)).
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A Perspectives on Environmental Law
Charles Meyers" 3 provides the initial perspective in this collection by, first, examining in some detail the contributions to environmental thought of Aldo Leopold as representative of nature philosophers." 4 He skillfully relates Leopold's land ethic to 18th and 19th
century Deist and Transcendentalist philosophy, which also sought a
more biocentric, less anthropocentric perspective. He also links the
preservationist impulse to the American rural ideal, dating back to the
Jeffersonian yeoman, the mythical agrarian philosopher tied to no one
but the land. Meyers depicts these romantic roots, exemplified by
Thoreau, as nostalgia for a simpler life, with fewer people and less
complex technologies. He wonders, though, if the environmental
writers' rejection of urbanism and technology does not overlook society's
dominant cultural values which include the art, literature, and music
more characteristic of urban life than rural.
Meyers also discusses Barry Commoner's four laws of ecology,
which Myers criticizes for being only descriptive. He asserts that the
conclusions which Commoner draws (mostly counseling inaction) from
his laws are his alone. 1 ' Instead of Commoner's ecological laws,
Meyers embraces the principles of welfare economies, whose solution is
to let the market allocate environmental resources. The welfare
economic perspective is attractive to Meyers because it seems to eschew
all value judgments except consumer preferences. However, this view
has engendered many critics," 6 both because they object to equating
public decision making with ability of individuals' willingness to pay
dollars, and because of the difficulty of assigning dollar values to
unpriced environmental resources. In a comment on Meyers' essay,
Dan Tarlock reminded his former teacher that environmental decision
making suffers from a pervasive lack of sound information about actual
costs and benefits; that past decision making was premised on an

1

3

Meyers, An Introductionto EnvironmentalThought: Some Sources and Some Criticisms,

50 IND. L.J. 426 (1975).
See also Freyfogle, The Land Ethic and PilgrimLeopold, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 217 (1990).
"'

See also Krier, The Political Economy of Barry Commoner, 20 ENVTL. L. 11 (1990).

See Blumm, The Fallaciesof Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY
371 (1992); Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205 (1974); Tribe,
Ways Not to Think About PlasticTrees: New Foundationsfor EnvironmentalLaw, 83 YALE L.J.
1315 (1974).
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(unwarranted) confidence that the resulting benefits would outweigh the
costs; and that the law needs to develop a "presumption of caution" by
expanding the definitions of harm and injury." 7
The second article, by Robert Blomquist, 1 18 asserts that the
complexity which characterizes modern American environmental law is
a consequence of three factors: (1) the multiplicity of different contending interests, (2) the evolutionary pace of change of environmental law,
and (3) the conflict between absolutist and utilitarian principles that
underlie most environmental controversies. Blomquist also supplies a
valuable narrative bibliography on a wide variety of environmental
writing, from the philosophical to the ecological to the futuristic. Along
the way, he introduces such influential environmental thinkers as E.F.
Schumacher, Barry Commoner, John Passmore, Samuel Hays, Roderick
Nash, and Donald Worster, among others. From his bibliography, the
reader can uncover valuable sources about all manner of environmental
information, ranging from the influence of the Old Testament on
environmental thought to Russian conservation policies to the deep
ecology, ecofeminist, and animal rights movements.
Professor Blomquist, however, seeks not just to summarize the
existing environmental literature; his project is to supply an intellectual
history of American environmental law by showing how, over the last
thirty years, environmental ideas in the fields of ecology, ethics and
economics have influenced American law. His survey includes Rachel
Carson's vivid account of the unintended consequences of human
manipulation of the environment; Garret Hardin and Kenneth
Boulding's demonstration that economic markets fail to efficiently
allocate environmental resources, producing a tragedy of the commons;
Judge Harold Leventhal's innovation of the "hard look" doctrine,
requiring a balancing of environmental and economic considerations in
natural resource decision making; Joseph Sax and Senator Edwin
Muskie's collaboration to make citizen suits a hallmark of environmental law; and both the Bruntland Report, which seeks to expand
international principles of environmental law, and the Valdez Principles, which attempt to infuse the environmental ethic into corporate
decision making.

'"Tarlock, A Comment on Meyers' Introductionto Environmental Thought, 50 IND. L.J. 454
(1975).
118 Blomquist, "Clean New World": Toward an Intellectual History of American Environmental Law, 1961-1990, 25 VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1990).
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The role of economics in environmental decision making is also the
subject of the third essay, Daniel Farber's review of Mark Sagoff's book,
The Economy of the Earth."9 Sagofi's book asserts that economic costbenefit analysis is an inappropriate basis for setting environmental
policy. Sagoff contends that, while economic efficiency may be
appropriate in pursuit of personal preferences or individual wants, it is
inappropriate in the case of collective values like environmentalism,
which are dependent on political, moral and cultural convictions. 20
Farber concludes that Sagoff is only partly right: he agrees that
mechanistic cost-benefit analysis cannot resolve essentially political
questions like environmental standard setting, but he thinks economic
efficiency is a valid social goal that should not be wholly ignored in
environmental decision making. 2 '
Farber also suggests that Sagoff is wrong to dismiss private
preferences and the virtues of ordinary life in the belief that government can easily modify these preferences. Farber cites the inability of
the former Soviet government to motivate workers on collective farms
and observes that cultural traditions and private preferences have
considerable force irrespective of paternalistic government policies.' 22
Farber claims Sagoff is both too cynical about private life and too
romantic about public life, the opposite end of the political spectrum
from the new Public Choice theorists (who include many law and
economics proponents), a philosophy that Farber has studied in some
detail.'23
Farber criticizes Sagoff s approach to risk management as
simplistic, then proceeds to give a lucid overview of the unreliable
nature of risk-benefit methodologies. Farber notes that cognitive
psychology studies show that individuals are notoriously poor at
processing risks. He then discusses the usual factors that influence
people's risk perceptions such as cause of death, age of the individual,
clusters of deaths, unfamiliarity of the risk and voluntariness of the
exposure-although he questions the relevance of the latter two. He
observes with some wonder that an emphasis on voluntariness can lead

"' Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1021
(1989) (reviewing M. SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1988)).
"1 See also Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981).
121 Farber, supra note 119, at 1037-38.
at 1039-40.
'2 Id.
" See Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986648

STUDYING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1992]

329

to perverse results: for example, a tolerance for 350,000 smoking
year, yet intolerance for minute amounts of hazardous
deaths per
4
wastes.

12

Farber does approve of Sagoff s characterization of the public
outrage over toxic chemicals as a consequence of "feeling that someone
secretly imposed a risk on others; it is this feeling of powerlessness that
gives rise to anger. " 1 25 He therefore endorses a kind of "environmental due process" approach to toxics controls that emphasizes full
disclosure and public participation. 126 Ultimately, he agrees with
Sagoff that the difficulty of assigning values to the costs and benefits of
health regulation forecloses reliance on mechanistic cost-benefit tests;
"we must rely," he concludes, "on such political virtues as dialogue,
open-mindedness, clarity, participation, and intelligence." 127 For

Farber, the public interest is not simply the sum of individual preferences, but a product of the political process itself: "in a democracy, the
political process creates the public interest in the process of searching
for it. The public interest can best emerge from a political process
possessing the liberal virtues of broad participation, tolerance and
intelligent deliberation." 28
B. Common Law Remedies and the Environment
Daniel Coquillette 129 supplies a useful historical perspective to
the common law's approach to the environment, "exhum[ing] . .. three

The first,
famous cases on Anglo-American property doctrine."'
William Aldred's Case,'' held in the early 17th century that nuisance
doctrine forbade any material interference with certain natural rights
necessary for the enjoyment of land, such as "wholesome air and light"
(although aesthetic injuries were not recoverable). Thus, ancient
nuisance doctrine espoused a protectionist, absolutist approach to the
environment that specifically rejected balancing the utility of neighboring activities.
124 Farber, supra note 119, at 1037.
125Id. at 1034.
126

Id. at 1034 and n.67.

127Id. at 1037.
128Id. at 1042.
129Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases
About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761 (1979).
'30 Id. at 764.
'3' 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
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The urge to balance gradually overwhelmed the old rule in the
19th century, however, and now dominates nuisance law."3 2 Professor
Coquillette disputes the origins of the balancing test, claiming that the
case widely thought to be the foundation case, St. Helens Smelting Co.
v. Tipping,13 3 actually affirmed the old absolutist rule.'
Nevertheless, the courts over the past century have almost uniformly adopted a
balance of utilities test in an effort to determine the reasonableness of
the conduct alleged to be a nuisance.135 This balancing accommodated
industrial growth by allowing defenses such as "coming to the nuisance," changed conditions, and use of best available technology, as well
as a determination that the utility of the defendant's conduct outweighed the gravity of harm to the plaintiff.3 ' Having courts conduct
such cost-benefit balancing was arguably beyond their institutional
capacity and eventually prompted legislatures to shift this responsibility
to administrators under modern pollution control legislation. Still, the
modern statutes have not preempted nuisance doctrine,3 7 and it often
is the only available vehicle for plaintiffs to receive compensation for
their injuries. Plaintiffs must, however, overcome substantial problems
in proving causation, especially with regard to the low-level, long-term
exposures that typically characterize toxic pollution. 3 '
Professor Coquillette's third exhumed case, Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois,' concerns the public trust doctrine under which
certain resources (traditionally, lands adjoining or submerged by water)
are held as res communes in trust for the public. Grants of these
resources in derogation of public uses were voidable. Citizens had
standing to enforce this trust in court, and Coquillette argues that they

132See also Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850

to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101.(1986).
133 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865).
134 Coquillette, supra note 129, at 784-85.
"' Two exceptions noted by Coquillette are Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682
(N.C. 1953); and Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1969). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 826; see also id. §§ 827-828 (factors in determining unreasonableness).
136 See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (Harv. 1977);
Bryson & Macbeth, PublicNuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts and EnvironmentalLaw,
2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241 (1972).
137 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1988 & Supp, 1992) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C.
§ 505(e)
(1988 & Supp. 1992) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act). But see Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (federal
common law preempted); International Paper Co. v. Oullette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (common law
of the state of discharge preserved).
138See Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987).
139 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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enjoyed a shift in the burden of proof which normally assumes
regularity of government action. 4 ' Coquillette welcomes recent
developments expanding the public trust doctrine, 4 ' but he criticizes
the chief intellectual proponent of the doctrine, Professor Sax, for
advocating it as a principle of administrative law, rather than as a
public ownership concept. 42 Coquillette does not make the nature of
his concerns clear, and it may be that he misunderstood Sax's argument
that one of the chief virtues of the public trust doctrine is the flexible
remedies it can supply to resolve different resource conflicts.'"
Joseph Sax, the intellectual father of the modern public trust
doctrine,' seeks to "liberate" the doctrine from its "historical shackles." "45
' Sax believes that, to the extent the doctrine is perceived as a
rigid prohibition preventing the disposition of tidelands or freezing their
uses to traditional ones, it is misunderstood. For Sax, the trust doctrine
is neither limited to tidal areas, nor an absolute bar to transfer or
development, but instead a property law doctrine premised on protecting reasonable public expectations: "the central idea of the public trust
is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in
common but without formal recognition of title."'" The trust doctrine
therefore seeks stable relationships and evolutionary changes.
Sax draws an analogy from the English experience with customary
rights, where public uses could be protected despite private ownership.
He suggests that public versus private property disputes will be
resolved not by mechanistic title searches, nor rigid adherence to
customary uses, but by pursuing feasible alternatives that avoid

140

Id.

at 817 (citing Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 225 A.2d 130

(N.J. 1966)).
14 See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979);
Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970). A more recent famous
case is National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983). See also Meyers, Variationon a Theme: Expanding the PublicTrust Doctrineto Include
Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723 (1989); McCurdy, Public Trust Protectionfor Wetlands,
19 ENVTL. L. 683 (1989); Symposium on the Public Trust and the Waters of the American West:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 19 ENVTL. L. 425-735 (1989) [hereinafter Symposium on the
Public Trust].
142 Coquillette, supra note 120, at 811.
143 See Blumm, Public Property and the Democratizationof Western Water Law: A Modern
View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573 (1989).
144Sax, The Public Trust Doctrinein NaturalLaw: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 471 (1970).
"4 See Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom its HistoricalShackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 185 (1980).
146 Id.
at 188.
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destabilizing expectations supporting social, economic, and ecological
systems. 4 v He relies on a California Supreme Court decision that
protected public uses despite a hundred years of private title because
public uses continued during private ownership.'" His emphasis on
feasible alternatives to resolve public/private rights conflicts perceptively
anticipated another California Supreme Court decision, the Mono Lake
case 149 -perhaps the most famous modern trust doctrine case5 0 by
three years.
Sax concludes by suggesting that the public trust doctrine demands
explicit, fully considered legislative judgments. He contends that
administrative decisions allocating trust resources should fail absent
legislation that attempts to minimize destabilizing expectations. Other
commentators have subsequently explored the trust doctrine's application to legislative and administrative decision making and its public
access and democratic decision-making themes, and a number have
devoted attention to the doctrine's geographic expansion beyond tidal
areas to water allocation and wetlands, and wildlife protection.' 5 '
One commentator has located the roots of the public trust in the federal
"equal footing" doctrine;'5 2 still another has advocated its application
in water pollution cases;' 5 3 and others have urged property
law
M
scholars to understand its relevance to property jurisprudence.
The public trust doctrine has also engendered critics, the most
persistent of whom is James Huffman. 5 5 Huffman has forcefully
criticized the views of Professor Sax for threatening to replace the

147Id. at 193.

149 Id. at 192 (citing City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
840 (1980)).
14'National Audubon Soc'y. v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983)).
" See Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrineand Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?,
30 ROcKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1985).
"' See also McCurdy, supra note 141; Meyers, supra note 141; see generally Symposium on
the Public Trust, supra note 141..
"' Wilkinson, The Headwatersof the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope
of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989).
" Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 485 (1989).
"4Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19
ENVTL. L. 515 (1989); see also Hunter, An EcologicalPerspectiveon Property: A Call for Judicial
Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 311 (1988).
15 See Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 19
ENVTL. L. 527 (1989); see also Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOwA L. REV. 631 (1986).
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democratic decisions of legislative bodies with subjective preferences
claiming judicial protection. 5 ' He considers the public trust a dangerous doctrine because it gives courts too much power to allocate
natural resources, and it effectively evades the constitutional requirement of paying 'Just compensation" for the taking of private property for
public uses.'5 7 A recent account comparing the perspectives of Sax
and Huffman argues that both fall short of supplying explicit analysis
of the social goods at stake in public trust decision making and suggests
that useful principles may be found in an examination of the natural
resources damage provisions of CERCLA and the Clean Water Act."
C. Environmental Regulation
The most venerable article in the collection is James Krier's 1971
timeless classic,15 9 supplying a conceptual overview of the pollution
problem and legal institutions. Krier provides a concise overview of the
market's imperfections in allocating environmental resources due to the
lack of "marketable packages" for collective goods like clean air and
water and the "free rider" problem.'
These imperfections justify
governmental intervention to correct the market's failure to allocate
environmental resources efficiently. Consideration of the appropriate
type of governmental intervention leads Krier to consider the famous
analysis of Professor Ronald Coase, which maintains that environmental conflicts are reciprocal in nature and that, where rational individuals can bargain without costs, they will achieve efficient resource
allocation without governmental intervention. 6 '
Krier appreciates that the Coase Theorem describes a world

15

Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings

of ProfessorsSax, Wilkinson, Dunning, and Johnson, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 565 (1986).
"' See Huffman, Avoiding the Taking Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public
Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171 (1987).
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f(4)-(5) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX4)(C), (f)(1) (1988) (CERCLA); see Reiser, Ecological Preservationas a Public Property Right: An
Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393 (1991); see also supra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
...
Krier, The PollutionProblem and Legal Institutions: A ConceptualOverview, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 429 (1971).
160 The free rider problem involves efforts to extract contributions from members of a group
in order to carry out transactions that will confer collective, nonexclusive benefits on the group.
Since these benefits are shared by contributors and noncontributors alike, there are economic
incentives not to contribute, and instead take a free ride on the efforts of the contributors.
161 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960).
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which-because of a pervasive lack of information of the costs and
benefits of environmental controls, high transaction costs, and the
frequent lack of rational bargaining--does not exist (as Coase himself
also recognized). Nevertheless, Krier's lucid discussion of the lessons of
Coasian analysis allows him to posit important principles for delineating environmental rights and liabilities in a world where collective
guesses are the inevitable rule. He suggests delineating environmental
rights (1) in ways in which, if wrong, market action can be corrected
most cheaply, and (2) which serve goals other than economic efficiency
(redistributing wealth, for example), so long as there is no apparent
adverse effect on resource allocation.'6 2 These principles lead Krier
to conclude that, in a typical case where the number of receptors
outnumber the number of polluters, bargaining costs are lowest when
liability is imposed on the polluters. 6 ' He thus develops a theory of
common-law liability based on resource allocation efficiency (as opposed
to moral principle), grounded on factors such as transaction costs, access
to information, and the free rider problem. But Krier also vividly
illustrates the inadequacies of reliance on common-law rules to resolve
environmental problems, including the substantive and procedural
burdens of proof that disadvantage environmental plaintiffs and the
courts' institutional inadequacy in resolving complex pollution problems. 6 4 He concludes (like Farber) 6 ' that the pollution problem "is
an essentially political one, ideally to be decided by the democratic
process."'N
Krier then proceeds to consider legislative approaches to environmental quality. Examining the Clean Air Act, he illustrates how key
decisions, based almost wholly on subjective factors of value choices, can
appear to be technical issues to be assigned to experts and advisory
committees. He believes leaving such questions to technocrats is
undemocratic and inappropriate for "the distinctly subjective nature of
environmental quality questions." 6 7
Krier proceeds to survey the variety of forms governmental
information may take, from regulation to subsidies to pricing techniques. He asserts that the American preference for regulation is

16 Krier, supra note 159, at 437-38.

16 Id. at 438.
'

Id.

at 443.

See supra notes 127-28.
1 Krier, supra note 159, at 441.
167Id. at 442.
''
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imbalanced---"and barren"--due largely to (an unfortunate) "catastrophe
theory of planning," a (misguided) desire to punish "wrongdoers," a
(short-sighted) desire to incur least near-term costs, and poor public
understanding of the nature of the pollution problem. 168 Where
regulation is employed, Krier prefers "performance" standards to
"specification" standards because they regulate only results, not
methods to achieve them, thus allowing pollution sources to develop
least-cost strategies and imposing lower administration costs as
well. 1' But his principal argument is for increased reliance on
pricing strategies, particularly establishing a pollution ceiling and then
conducting an auction of transferable, limited-term pollution rights.
This proposal seems remarkably prescient in light of the increasing
70
attention it has drawn in recent years.
Thomas McGarity examines three distinct approaches to environmental regulation in his case study on the chemical industry: 7 '
(1) media-quality-based, focused on the quality of the receiving air or
water;'7 2 (2) technology-based, focused on available control technolo-,
gies; 173 and (3) balancing approaches that require cost-benefit calculations. 1 74 Like Krier, he discusses in some detail the reasons the
market fails to efficiently allocate environmental resources (including
the inaccuracy of the economists' "full knowledge" assumption, the
persistence of transaction costs, and the exclusive emphasis on
anthropocentric utility) and the inability of the common-law tort system
to remedy those deficiencies (due to problems in proving causation,
75
transaction costs, and the general passivity of the tort system).
McGarity points out that the Coase Theorem's assumption that
bargaining will produce the same amount of resources devoted to
pollution or workplace safety control irrespective of industry liability is
not even theoretically true because different results will be obtained if
unpriced resources are valued under a "willingness to pay" model,
rather than under a "willingness to sell" model. Choosing which model

68 Id. at 460-61; see also J. KRIER & E. URSIN, A CASE ESSAY ON THE CALIFORNIA AND
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940-1975 (1977).

69Krier, supra note 159, at 463.
70See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 2.

.71McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health

and172
Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (Summer 1983).
Id. at 162.
173Id. at 163.
174Id. at 165.
175 Id. at 173-74.
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to employ is fundamentally a value choice (more resources will be
devoted to environmental controls under the latter than the former,
which generally undervalues the benefits of environmental protection).
And McGarity cautions that economists have no better qualifications to
make that choice than the general public.176 For all of these reasons,
he suggests governmental intervention is necessary.
McGarity sees the advantages of government controls as including
lower causation requirements, anticipatory controls, broader planning
horizons, reduced transaction costs through generic controls and
government enforcement, and greater scientific expertise and political
accountability. Understanding these advantages does not, though,
answer the question of the type of governmental intervention likely to
be most effective, and thus McGarity proceeds to examine three
governmental decision-making models: cost-benefit balancing, mediabased controls that frequently are based on absolutist goals, and
technology-based regulation.
McGarity rejects cost-benefit balancing in setting of environmental
goals because of insurmountable difficulties in accurately valuing costs
and risks, the (frequently hidden) value judgments underlying costbenefit models, and the economic model's inattention to the wealth
shifting implications of governmental intervention among polluters,
consumers, and victims.17 7 Not only does McGarity claim that Congress has been justified in largely rejecting cost-benefit balancing, he
shows how its frequent resort to absolutist, inefficient environmental
goals can be supported both on symbolic grounds and nonutilitarian
moral judgments, 7 ' a theme pursued extensively in a recent study by
Mark Sagoff.'7 9 However, he acknowledges that there are extreme
difficulties in achieving such aspirational goals;"8 which explains why
implementation of pollution control policy is a function of media-based
or technology-based regulation, and usually a combination of both that
allows for some consideration of costs and feasibility.

17

6

Id. at 191-99; see also Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation and Toxic Risk Assessment,

5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988).
177 McGarity, supra note 171, at 193-95; see also Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and Risks:
Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking,4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
178McGarity, supra note 171, at 196.
.79 See Sagoff, The Principlesof FederalPollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19 (1986);
see also supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
o McGarity, supra note 171, at 199; see also Dwyer, The Pathologyof Symbolic Legislation,
17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990); Henderson & Pearson, Implementing FederalEnvironmentalPolicies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978).
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Although both approaches characterize modern pollution control,
McGarity supplies a valuable critical analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of each. He finds the media-quality approach superior in
terms of its ability to be implemented in an economically efficient
manner, its likelihood of surviving court challenges, and its potential to
spur technological innovation.' 8 ' However, the approach has never
drawn clear links between ambient media-quality and particular source
emissions. Furthermore, the media-quality approach cannot with any
reasonable accuracy predict the health effects of low-dose exposures,
and is subject to administratively irresistible pressures to convert
ambient media levels to technology-based source controls.
Technology-based standards, on the other hand, are attractive to
regulatory entities because they allow for considerable administrative
discretion in setting targets, are easy to enforce, and do not threaten
industry with economic shutdown.18 2 Yet they have proved vulnerable
to court challenge, require considerable administrative expertise,
arguably give industry too large a role in the standard setting process,
and do not address intercompany inequities or encourage technological
innovation as well as the media-based approach." 3
McGarity ultimately opts for a mixed system of media-based and
technology-based controls. He defends absolutist goals, even if they are
unachievable, because he believes that "reaching El Dorado is not
always as important as the attempt.""s He argues for retaining twotiered technology-based controls on old and new sources, with sufficient
administrative flexibility to avoid providing incentives to firms to extend
the life of existing, more polluting sources. Interestingly, he disagrees
with Krier's preference for performance, rather than specification
standards,'8 5 contending that the theoretical efficiency benefits of the
former are not worth the increased transaction costs (particularly court
challenges) involved in demonstrating the level of pollution removal a
given technology is capable of producing.
McGarity would also levy a media-quality-based charge on all units
of pollution to supply a continuing incentive to reduce emissions beyond
existing technologies. This revenue would provide money to be used for
pollution control research and development, and perhaps even to fund
"' McGarity, supra note 171, at 203, 211, 222.

at 221.
Id. at 222.
'4 Id. at 233.
18" See supra note 169 and accompanying text.

182Id.
'83
1
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a victim compensation program. He contends that such a charge would
not be expensive to administer because it would not attempt to induce
a particular level of media quality-its dual purposes would be only to
reinforce society's absolutist goals and to encourage development of
more sophisticated control technologies. Thus, no complex risk
assessment or technology assessment would precede imposition of the
charge. McGarity's thought-provoking proposal is not one that
economic-minded reformers like Ackerman and Stewart" 6 are likely
to embrace, however.
D. Economic Incentives and the Environment
Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart are among the leaders of a
group of law and economics critics of the current system of environmental regulation. Their article' 8 7 is a response to an article by
Howard Latin, 8 an article well worth reading on its own merits.
Latin criticizes the preoccupation of reformers like Ackerman and
Stewart with theoretical efficiency, but gives inadequate attention to
real decision-making costs and implementation constraints. He
concedes that the current system of regulatory standards might be
economically inefficient but contends that the characteristics of
environmental regulation-including pervasive uncertainties about
costs, risks and benefits, high decision-making costs, and manipulative
strategic behavior by both public and private interests-would eviscerate any theoretic efficiencies of alternative "economically sensitive"
models. Latin charges Ackerman and Stewart of being unwitting
academic water carriers for the political deregulation army that has
dominated national politics since 1980.
Ackerman and Stewart, in response to Latin's charges, levy a
renewed attack on the existing system. They claim the current
regulatory emphasis wastes billions of dollars by ignoring the individual
differences among plants, penalizes new products and industries
(adversely affecting international competitiveness), provides no
incentives for new technologies, imposes massive information-gathering
costs on regulators (and an incentive to litigate), and encourages

l See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 2.
7

18 Id.

"s Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards
and 'Fine-Tuning"Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985).
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administrators to regulate only a few pollutants.18 9 They also argue
that the existing system is deficient because it issues pollution permits
without charge and fails to allow for transfers of pollution permits."9'
Under Ackerman and Stewart's proposal, pollution permits would
be capped at existing levels, issued at an auction, be tradeable, be for
limited terms only, and eliminate the distinction between old and new
sources. They contend that such a system would (1) save billions of
dollars, (2) reward innovation in clean-up techniques, (3) eliminate the
current penalty on new (they assume, productive) investment, (4) reduce
administrative costs, (5) reduce litigation, (6) offer "a rich source of
budgetary revenue," and (7) free up administrative resources for
enforcement. 9 ' Ackerman and Stewart see only four tasks for the
bureaucracy: (1) to ascertain the current level of allowable emissions,
(2) to conduct a fair auction that would sell pollution rights for limited
terms, (3) to maintain an efficient title registry, and (4) to consistently
penalize permit violators. 9 2 They claim that environmental quality
could be improved by reducing existing emissions through increased
charges over time, although they do admit their proposals do not resolve
the problem with respect to toxic "hot spots." Nevertheless, they profess
not to worry because their proposal caps emissions at existing levels,
while producing "a more democratic, and more enlightened, dialogue on
the nature of America's evolving environmental objectives."'9 3 However, a "second generation" of reforms they propose (to be implemented
some years after the marketable permit auction) would allow different
regions of the country to reduce permitted emissions on the basis of
cost-effectiveness tests and special regional conditions. One might
doubt their claim that enabling regulators to cut back three times more
in some areas than in others would produce less litigation.
Finally, Ackerman and Stewart contend that, in scrapping the
current system of technology-based limitations, their system would
encourage administrators to conduct risk-benefit assessments on new
pollutants and, because the bureaucracy would share in revenues
produced by the marketable permit auctions, there would be economic
incentives to control new risks."M This large role they see for govern-

189

Ackerman & Stewart, note 2, at 1334.

190Id.
...
See also Stewart, supra note 2.
" Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 2, at 1347.
193
"9

Id.
Id.

at 1350.
at 1359-61.
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ment risk assessment stands in marked contrast to McGarity's proposal,
which seeks a reduced governmental role in risk assessment. 195
Joel Mintz supplies a synopsis of both the Latin and AckermanStewart approaches. 196 He maintains that Ackerman and Stewart's
characterization of the existing system as one dominated by a search for
best available technology is a "misleading oversimplification," since
many pollution control limits are set on the basis of other standards.
And he doubts that Ackerman and Stewart's "first generation" reforms
will produce significant benefits because the government will remain
responsible for setting overall pollution limits within which the auction
will function, and thus will. remain subject to the problems of bureaucratic centralization, procedural delay, and litigation. He does not think
the reforms will reduce the government's information processing
burden, and he claims that improved enforcement is more a function of
professional staff turnover than economic incentives to enhance agency
budgets. 197
Mintz also questions the reliance of Ackerman and Stewart's
"second generation" reforms on risk assessment. He suggests that not
enough is known about the operation of ecological systems or the health
effects of chemicals to justify extensive reliance on models that attempt
to balance technocratically costs and benefits. In addition, he doubts
that such a system will produce democratic decision making more
sensitive to the public will. But Mintz does not dismiss Ackerman and
Stewart's reforms because he agrees that the current system is dilatory
and wasteful, and he is not persuaded (as Latin is) that the only choices
are crude regulation or no regulation at all. Mintz therefore endorses
local marketable permit schemes, capped by existing regulatory
standards, on a demonstration project basis to allow empirical testing
of the concept.
E. Beyond EnvironmentalRegulation
Adam Babich agrees with the law and economics critics that the
current regulatory system is neither efficient nor comprehensive enough
to force basic societal behavior changes necessary to resolve environSee supra text preceding note 186.
l

Mintz, Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Comment on a Recent

Debate, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 149 (1991).
' See also Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of EPA's
Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 1970-1987, 18 ENVTL. L. 683 (1988).
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mental problems.'9 8 However, he does not advocate a change to
marketplace principles; instead, he argues that new threats of civil
liability for environmental damage will motivate improved environmental action. Babich claims this new liability-based approach to
environmental protection has already been instituted in the statutes
Congress enacted in the 1980s-principally, (CERCLA)-which "disrupt
the normal routines of business and consumers."'
Like Ackerman and Stewart, Babich criticizes the current system's
reliance on "command and control" regulation because it rests on false
assumptions about the government's ability to identify environmental
problems, set priorities, and develop workable and enforceable regulations. 2' But he also adds telling criticisms of the regulatory system's
tolerance for exemptions for special interests, most notably for the
federal government's own pollution sources. He characterizes the
existing system as one in which Congress sets absolutist, symbolic
goals, then tolerates administrative regulations which implicitly and
explicitly call for cost-benefit balancing.2 0 1 This arrangement may
constitute good politics, he admits, but he claims it erodes public
confidence in environmental protection.
Babich also (like Ackerman and Stewart)2 °2 decries the regulatory system's glacial implementation speed. 20 3 However, he notes that
delays are not only the consequence of litigation but also of interference
by the President's Office of Management and Budget and of cumbersome and complex enforcement (for example, the current regulatory
definition of hazardous waste is ten pages long). He faults the current
system's reliance on government planning and its lack of incentives for
20 4
self-policing.
For Babich, economic reforms, such as Ackerman and Stewart's
marketable permit approach, are not a complete answer to the
shortcomings of the regulatory system. Babich acknowledges such
reforms may reduce some of the costs of environmental protection, but
worries about their inability to prevent toxic "hot spots," their heavy
reliance on government risk assessments, and their failure to force the
19 Babich, Understandingthe New Era in EnvironmentalLaw, 41 S.C. L. REV. 733

(1990).
1d.
'0

Id.

at 735; see supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA).
at 736.

201 Id.

at 737-46.
moSee supra note 289 and accompanying text.
2w Babich, supra note 198, at 746.
204 Id. at 746-47.
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private sector to bear the risk if permitted discharges fail to protect
public health.
Babich maintains that a new era of environmental law began with
the enactment of CERCLA in 1980, which shifted the primary focus
from "prospective regulation to retrospective liability."2 " 5 He claims
that CERCLA's imposition of strict (no-fault), joint and several, and
retroactive liability impose "new planning and cleanup obligations on all
segments of the economy."2 °6 The statute makes all "responsible
parties" (that is, all past and present owners of waste facilities, as well
as generators and transporters of hazardous waste) liable for investigation, cleanup, and litigation costs and also damages to natural resources. Moreover, it authorizes not only government cleanups but also
cleanups by responsible parties and others (who then may recover their
expenses from responsible parties).
Babich shows how this liability scheme creates powerful new
incentives for responsible parties to police their own conduct as well as
their peers.20 7 Environmental audits are now commonplace prior to
real estate transfers, for example. This self-policing is taking place
without waiting for governmental action and is not tied directly to
regulatory standards. Further, Babich argues that uncertainties over
potential liability and the prospect of extremely expensive (and likely
wasteful) government cleanups actually increase incentives for
responsible parties to clean up quickly and to maintain compliance with
all regulatory standards. 0 8 Thus, the liability system supplies
continuous incentives to businesses to avoid pollution problems in ways
the regulatory system does not. Babich, however, suggests that the
liability scheme could be improved by expanding the legal remedies
available to the victims of toxic pollution and lowering their burden of
proof.
Arnold Reitze, author of one of the pioneering textbooks on
environmental law,20 9 charges that current environmental law lacks
focus.2 10 He contends that too much time, effort, and expense is

20'

206
207

Id. at 749-50.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 755-58; see also Dechert & Smith, EnvironmentalLiability and Economic Incentives

for Hazardous Waste Management, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 935 (1988).
'0 Babich, supra note 198, at 760; see also Frost, StrictLiability as an Incentive for Cleanup
of ContaminatedProperty, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 951 (1988).
2
A. REITzE, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND AND RESOURCES (1974).
210 Reitze, Environmental Policy-It Is Time for a New Beginning, 14
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
111 (1989).
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devoted to pollution control when the reality is that the marginal
benefits of increased controls will seldom justify their marginal
costs.2 1' Reitze makes a number of unsettling comparisons, including
(1) a national preoccupation with low level exposures to hazardous
waste and a national tolerance for over 300,000 smoking-related deaths
per year; 212 (2) preoccupation with automotive tailpipe emissions while
rejecting mandatory airbags for passengers who perish at a 50,000 per
year rate;21 3 and (3) extreme scrutiny devoted to groundwater contamination while allowing massive groundwater mining for low value
2 14
agricultural crops, many of which require government subsidies.
Reitze wants the government to restore some perspective to environmental policy by expanding its pollution control policies into a comprehensive environmental policy that includes population control, materials
conservation, and energy policy components.
Reitze recounts a sorry history of national population control and
materials conservation policies: the former now consists essentially of
the Bush administration's pronatal, antiabortion policy; the latter is
nonexistent (not surprising in a nation which consumes eleven times
the world's per capita rate of energy, six times as much steel, and four
times as much grain). 215 Reitze then examines the potential of a
number of unimplemented provisions of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act to improve materials conservation. He also reviews the
track record of national energy policy vacillations during the 1970s and
1980s, from President Carter's "soft" paths to President Reagan's "hard"
ones, noting that despite the ineffectiveness of government conservation
efforts, price increases induced six times more energy savings in
efficiency improvements than that generated by new sources.2 16
Finally, Reitze cites the government's weakening of fuel efficiency
standards as particularly inane, observing that the average car
generates its weight in carbon emissions each year and that, if the fifty
miles per gallon level that is technically achievable were reached, global
gasoline consumption could be reduced by a quarter, with corresponding
1
2 1Id. at 116-17; see also Krier, The PoliticalEconomy of Barry Commoner, 20 ENVTL. L. 11

(1990).
212 Reitze, supra note 209, at 115 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, SMOKING-RELATED DEATHS AND FINANCIAL COSTS (Sept. 1985)); see also supra note

124 and accompanying text.
212 Reitze, supra note 207, at 118.
214
Id. at 115-17.
215See id. at 121-28.

216See id. at 138-51.
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2 17
improvement in national security.
Reitze's prescription for the future is in five parts. He would first
reorder the Department of Energy's budget so that it becomes a real
energy agency, instead of expending two-thirds of its budget on nuclear
weapons production.2 18 Second, he would tax gasoline to increase its
price to reflect its real costs, including defense costs necessary to keep
imported oil flowing.2 1 9 Third, he recommends a major effort to
reduce energy used in agriculture, including soil conservation efforts. 220 Fourth, he posits three criteria for energy technologies to
replace petroleum; he would support only those that are (1) sustainable
without serious harm to ecosystems, (2) decentralized, and (3) produce
net energy. 22 ' These criteria would rule out increased use of nuclear
power or conversion to alcohol fuels and would emphasize solar, wind,
and hydropower. Finally, Reitze would charge the President's Council
on Environmental Quality with developing a coherent national
population policy.222 These reforms, he suggests, will rescue environmental law from becoming merely a technician's field and return it to
its proper role of "honestly confront[ing] the physical and biological
2
limits of our world and seek[ing means] to live within these limits." 1

F. The Future of Environmental Law
Robert Hahn and Kenneth Richards,2 24 then staff members of the
President's Council of Economic Advisors, attempt to establish a
framework to help explain the increasing use of international environmental agreements. They supply a brief history of international
regulation of the environment and sketch a general model of how
international environmental agreements-increasingly popular due to
economic growth and reduced costs of exchanging information--emerge.
In Hahn and Richards's view, the well-known fable of the "Prisoner's Dilemma," under which the rational outcome is not to cooperate,
fails to depict accurately the dynamic forces that influence the emer217 Id.
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222 Id. at 155.
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Id. at 156.

" Hahn & Richards, The Internalizationof EnvironmentalRegulation, 30 HARV. INTL L.J.
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gence of international environmental agreements. 225 These forces
include scientific consensus about the cause and seriousness of a
problem, public concern, perceptions of fairness among the negotiating
parties, economic costs, the number of negotiating participants, and the
existence of previous agreements. But the dominant force is domestic
political concerns. Identifying these factors allows Hahn and Richards
to explain such matters as why developing countries favor standards on
a per capita basis, while Europeans favor percentage reductions, and
the U.S. promotes state-of-the-art control technologies with credits for
prior pollution reductions. Hahn and Richards also suggest why
agreements tend to have grace periods prior to going into effect to
postpone economic costs, why weak enforcement and self-monitoring
tend to characterize them, and how the choice of a negotiating and
sponsoring forum like the United Nations Environment Programme or
the U.N. Economic Committee for Europe can affect the development
and enforcement of an agreement.
Hahn and Richards use their framework to draw some lessons for
U.S. policy and make predictions about the likelihood of an agreement
on global warming. They suggest that the White House should not
formulate policies based on world opinion because their theory predicts
many international environmental agreements, some of which may have
negative net economic effects. Instead, they contend that the President
should define and articulate clear priorities that account for domestic
economic costs, attempt to shape domestic and world opinion, and sign
only "effective and meaningful" agreements. Their framework predicts
that a global warming agreement is not likely very soon because its
benefits would be spread unevenly and its costs would be high. For
these reasons, Hahn and Richards conclude that a global warming
treaty will require "a much greater consensus on the scientific aspects
of the problem and a much greater level of public concern," factors
which led to the Montreal Protocol on stratospheric ozone pollution. m6
William Reilly, President Bush's Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator, examines the kinds of changes environmental law has
witnessed over the past decade and makes predictions for its future.2 27

m Id. at 429.
'Id.
at 444; see also Mintz, Progress Toward a Healthy Sky: An Assessment of the London
Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 YALE J.
INT'L. L. (1991); Morrisette, The Evolution of PolicyResponses to StratosphericOzone Depletion,
19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 793 (1989).
17 Reilly, The Future of Environmental Law, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 351 (1989).
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Reilly discusses the evolution of the focus of environmental law from the
national level to the global, noting that the pressing environmental
problems of the 1990s-global warming, stratospheric ozone depletion,
and tropical rain forest destruction-will require international collaboration of an unprecedented scale.'
Portraying the environmental initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s as
"one of the great success stories of American life and history,"22 9 he
points to the challenge of shifting emphasis from a relatively few large
sources of pollution to millions of small, highly decentralized and
diverse sources. For example, ground-level ozone pollution is the
product of automobiles and many small businesses such as print shops,
bakeries, and dry cleaners. Lawn fertilizers and garden insecticides
contribute to estuarine pollution. These sources have never been
subjected to regulation, and their cleanup will require a coordinated
effort from businesses, individuals, and government. Environmental
education will be necessary to change personal behavior and to enable
the public to make more informed risk-benefit decisions.
Reilly acknowledges that EPA often must make decisions on the
basis of data that is often incomplete, contradictory, and ambiguous.
Nevertheless, he suggests that if regulatory disagreements can be kept
to "a more scientific plane," the public will have more trust in regulatory decisions."0
Reilly suggests that the future of environmental law will involve
more international law and diplomacy.2 3 1 He predicts, somewhat
paradoxically, an increasing emphasis on state and local initiatives,
contending that one of the failures of the past has been the inability to
organize in the state capitals as effectively as in Washington. He also
sees greater attention to both enforcement and economic incentives in
the future and maintains that waste reduction in the 1990s must
receive attention equivalent to energy conservation in the 1970s, when
energy use was reduced by forty percent. 2
Reilly calls upon the environmental lawyers of the future to help

at 351-52.
at 352.
2 Id. at 353-54.
"

Id.

2Id.

30

z3 Id. at 354; see also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION (D.
Kay & H. Jacobson, eds., 1983); Gaines, InternationalPrinciplesfor TransnationalEnvironmentalLiability: Can Developments in MunicipalLaw Break the Impasse?, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 311
(1989); Developments in the Law, InternationalEnvironmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484
(1991).
232 Reilly, supra note 227, at 354.
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eliminate the inconsistencies and conflicts in current environmental law
by thinking in terms of systems, incentives, and multimedia approaches.
Finally, he suggests that to prepare adequately for the environmental
challenges of the 21st century, this decade must witness a national and
global transformation of the environment from the margins of public
policy to the mainstream of domestic policy and foreign affairs.'
III. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to both supply an introductory survey
to the environmental law field as well as outline a selection of readings
that examine the theories and practice of modern environmental law.
My hope is that this effort proves useful not just to those who have just
begun to study environmental law but also to those with some
experience in the field. There is no doubt that environmental law
teachers would benefit from a quality selection of seminar readings such
as those that are available in other areas of the law.'
If this Article
constitutes a step in that direction, it will have achieved its purpose.

Id. at 355.
' I have in mind the excellent selection of readings in J.H. GARVEY & T.A. ALEINIKOFF,
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER (1989). See also, A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ANTHOLOGY (M. Glennon ed., 1992).
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